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Why compare the United 
States and Germany? 
The Numbers 
United States 
• Total installed capacity: 4 GW 
• Trending towards utility-scale 
 
 
 
Germany 
• Total installed capacity: 25 GW 
• More distributed 

Germany’s Policy:  
EEG 
• Erneurebare-Energien-Gesetz (“EEG”), or 
Renewable Energy Sources Act  
– Law since 2000 
• Creates feed-in tarrifs 
– Requires fixed term contracts between electricity 
suppliers and renewable energy system owners at 
rates offering a guaranteed and reasonable return 
on investment 
• EEG sets 20 year contract terms 
Erneurebare-Energien-Gesetz  
• Different rates for electricity consumed on site and sold 
into grid 
– Section 33(1): tariffs based on system size of rooftop 
installations selling electricity into the grid 
• Smaller installations get more per kWh than larger installations 
– Section 33(2): tarrifs for electricity consumed on site. 
• Less than Section 33(1) 
• Owners more than through the tariff under section 33(1), after 
taking in account money saved on taxes and electricity costs  
• Designed to smooth integration of distributed solar PV into grid 
• Owners could pick and choose between sections 33(1) 
and 33(2) 
• As of April, 2012 at least 15% must be consumed on 
site (but OK because of high retail rates) 
 
Three Reasons for Success 
• Reason 1: EEG tariff rates ensure a reasonable 
rate of return to investors in a granular fashion 
(6–8% ROI) 
• Reason 2: EEG creates certainty through 20-year 
contracts set at the tariff rates at the time of 
contract formation 
• Reason 3: EEG allows for unlimited system sizes, 
such that all electricity generated does not need 
to be consumed on site 
What’s holding back the states? 
Short Answer: 
The current federal-state 
relationship makes it difficult for 
states to achieve these three factors 
Federal Power Act 
• The Federal Power Act of 1920 (“FPA”) gives 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) jurisdiction over wholesale electricity 
rates. States have jurisdiction over retail rates. 
• FERC must approve wholesale transactions as 
“just and reasonable” 
• Constitional basis of jurisdiction:  
– The Commerce Clause  
– All wholesale transactions within interconnected 
grid are in interstate commerce, even if 
transaction wholly intrastate 
 
One Exception: 
Qualified Facilities  
(small solar included) under the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) 
PURPA 
• Avoided Cost: “the cost to the electric utility of 
the electric energy which, but for the purchase 
from such … small power producer, such utility 
would generate or purchase from another 
source.” 
• Price utilities would have paid for electricity, had 
the QF not sold electricity into the grid 
– Usually set by cost of natural gas generated electricity 
• Issue: avoided cost not enough 
California AB 1631 
• Waste Heat and Carbon Emissions Reduction 
Act. 
• Passed in 2007, attempted to bypass FERC’s 
jurisdiction. 
• Required utilities to “offer to purchase” at pre-
specified rates electricity from combined heat 
and power (“CHP”) facilities meeting 
efficiency requirements 
• Main idea: FERC would still need to approve 
California AB 1631 
• In brief to FERC, CPUC argued federal law should 
not preempt its regulations “due to the 
compelling nature and urgency of reducing GHG 
emissions.” 
• FERC found it constituted impermissible 
wholesale rate-setting by CPUC 
• FERC: while it “appreciate[d] that the … feed-in 
tariff program is intended to reduce GHG 
emissions, the arguments concerning the 
environmental considerations … do not excuse 
the Commission from its statutory obligations.” 
• FERC Clarification: 
– States can create multi-tiered avoided cost rate 
structures for QFs. 
– “Where a state requires a utility to procure a certain 
percentage of energy from generators with certain 
characteristics, generators with those characteristics 
constitute the sources that are relevant to the 
determination of the utility’s avoided cost for that 
procurement requirement.” 
• Issue: avoided cost to utilities is less than 
renewable provider’s cost 
– Unbundled RPS laws allow utilities to pay less than 
cost required for renewable generation 
– Net-metering operates outside of wholesale market 
 
California AB 1631 
PURPA’s Bottom Line 
• States cannot create the same, target tariff 
rates as EEG. 
• Avoided cost is an inaccurate proxy for 
offering distributed solar owners a reasonable 
return on their investments 
State Solutions: 
Net-Metering and Renewable Portfolio 
Standards 
Net-Metering 
Net-Metering 
• 43 states + DC 
• Meter runs backwards when 
electricity delivered into grid 
• Receive retail rate, which is 
greater than wholesale/avoided 
cost 
• Loophole: FERC order (94 FERC ¶ 
61,340) found acceptable 
because state laws regulate 
retail, rather than wholesale 
transactions 
Select Net-Metering Issues 
• System Size Caps 
– Incentive limited to what can be consumed on site 
– Often include hard size caps 
– Prevents unlimited sizes of EEG 
• Retail Rate Inaccurate Proxy 
– Retail rates change 
– Retail rates often inadequate 
• Even in Los Angeles, which employs time of use retail 
pricing, solar is not cost-competitive without other 
incentives 
– Unlike EEG, variable and not targeted 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
Renewable Portfolio Standards 
• 35 states + DC 
• Many create solar renewable energy credits 
(SRECs) which utilities must purchase 
• Phase in over time 
– MD General Assembly accelerated recently, now 2% 
by 2020; used to be 2022. 
• Loophole: FERC order (105 FERC ¶ 61,004) found 
acceptable because RECs represent 
“environmental attributes” of electricity 
generated and not electricity itself 
– But see 139 FERC ¶ 61,061 (April 2012) – jurisdiction 
over bundled (but not unbundled) RECs 
 
Select RPS Issues 
• Price Volatility 
– SRECs are market commodities 
– Oversupply leads to price drop 
• Occurred in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, DC, and 
Maryland 
– Creates uncertainty, uncertainty requires higher returns 
Final Thoughts 
• Huge potential in US 
• FPA and PURPA limit growth, states unable to 
create fixed price, targeted feed-in tarrifs that 
allow for unlimited system sizes like under EEG 
• Solutions: 
– Federal feed-in tarrif 
– Return authority to states 
– Local level 
Thank you. 
Questions? 
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